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ALLSTATE OMITS, GLOSSES OVER, OR MISSTATES 
PACTS OP CASE TO LEND CREDENCE TO ITS MISCHARACTERIZATION 
OF BLACK'S CLAIM AGAINST ALLSTATE AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE 
THIRD-PARTY CLAIM AGAINST THE GALLAGHER POLICY 
In its it's Brief, Appellee Allstate ("Allstate") 
omits, glosses over, or misstates certain facts or circumstances 
underlying this case in an apparent effort to bring the analysis 
of this appeal under the legal authority of cases dealing with a 
third-party claimant's allegations of bad faith by an insurer in 
handling a claim against its insured, primarily the recently 
decided case of Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah 1999). 
Appellant Black ("Black") has consistantly denied Allstate's 
mischaractization of his claim against Allstate as being a claim 
"against the Gallagher policy" and has insisted that his claim 
against Allstate is one for breach of his own policy with 
Allstate. Black will now address Allstate's factual omissions or 
misstatements which Allstate uses to support its 
mischaracterization of Black's action against it as an 
impermissible "third-party" direct claim, and will distinguish 
Allstate's case authority, infra, in Point II. 
In its "Statement of the Case," Allstate's brief 
states, "After the accident Black submitted a claim to Allstate, 
who insured both Black and Gallagher." Although Allstate 
acknowledges that it insured both Black and Gallagher, it fails 
to provide the complete picture by neglecting to also acknowledge 
that Gallagher also filed a claim against Black's liability 
1 
policy, and Allstate then proceeded to have its own claims office 
adjust both claims together rather than refer the matter to an 
independent adjuster because of the obvious conflict of interest. 
See Appellant/s Brief, "Statement of Facts" at p. 5-6. 
Allstate's "Statement of the Case" goes on to allege 
that "In his Complaint Black asserted that Gallagher was 
responsible for the accident. Black also alleged that because 
Gallagher was at fault for the accident, Allstate had a duty to 
settle with Black." Appellee's Brief, p. 3. And further, that in 
opposing Allstate's summary judgment motion, Black "acknowledged 
that his action against Allstate was first-party in nature, but 
that it was based on his conclusion that Gallagher was primarily 
at fault for the accident." Id. Black believes that his Complaint 
clearly sets forth a claim against Allstate for breach of its 
contract with him, specifically its duty to defend Black against 
the Gallagher claim and its duty to act fairly and in good faith 
in its contractual obligations to Black. The fact that Black's 
claim against Allstate for breach of its contract with him is 
inextricably tied to the issue of the respective drivers' "fault" 
and Allstate's adjustment thereof is hardly surprising [see, 
e.g., this Court's decision in Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 
(Utah 1997)], but that fact does not turn Black's claim against 
Allstate herein into an impermissible third-party claim against 
the Gallagher policy. 
Allstate then goes on to assert that Black, in his Rule 
59 motion following the bench trial which found Gallagher 100% 
negligent and Black not negligent, argued to the trial court that 
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he should be able to pursue an action directly against Allstate 
"because it had not settled with Black as Black had previously 
demanded." Appellee's Brief, p. 5. It should be apparent on 
review of Black's Rule 59 motion that it was primarily addressed 
to the fact that the ripeness issue with which the trial court 
had been concerned at the summary judgment hearing had been 
resolved in Black's favor. 
In its "Statement of Revelant Facts" portion of its 
brief, Allstate again appears to suggest that this case involved 
a simple, single claim by Black against the Gallagher liability 
coverage. Appellee's Brief, p. 6, f 2. As noted above, both Black 
and Gallagher filed claims against the other's insurance coverage 
and Allstate adjusted both claims together, in spite of the 
obvious conflict of interest. 
Allstate goes on to repeatedly mischaracterize the 
basis of Black's claim against it as an impermissible third-party 
claim against the Gallagher policy, apparently in hopes that if 
it repeated the erroneous assertion often enough it will be 
believed. Allstate states in paragraph 5 of its "Statement of 
Relevant Facts" that in Black's own Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Black asserted that because Gallagher's fault for the 
accident was so clear, "Allstate should be ordered to pay Black's 
claim." In fact, Black's partial summary judgment motion was 
based on the premise that, as to Black's claim against Allstate, 
the facts were not in dispute (Allstate had agreed that Gallagher 
had run the red light immediately prior to the accident and 
failed to submit any affidavit or other admissible evidence to 
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dispute the facts asserted in the affidavit of the witness, Roger 
Anderson) , and Allstate/s adjustment deteritiiination that Black was 
primarily at fault for the accident was erroneous as a matter of 
law* 
A further potentially misleading assertion is found in 
paragraph 1 of Allstate's "Statement of Relevant Facts," at pp. 
5-6 of its brief, where Allstate states "Both drivers received 
citations from the police officer investigating the accident." 
Aside from the general inadmissibility of such evidence, Allstate 
knows that Black's citation was dismissed and Gallagher forfeited 
bail on his citation. This misleading statement is repeated in 
footnote 3 on page 13 of Allstate's brief. 
Another misleading statement is found in footnote 2 on 
page 13 of Allstate's brief, wherein Allstate asserts, in part, 
"While the duty of an insurer includes the duty to defend an 
insured, there was no action by Gallagher against Black." While 
Allstate may argue that its use of the term "action" was intended 
to mean "lawsuit," Allstate knows that this case did not arise 
out of some "stand alone" claim by Black against the Gallagher 
policy, but arose out of the circumstance of both parties to the 
accident filing claims against the other's policy coverages, and 
Allstate's decision to adjust both claims together despite the 
conflict of interest. 
POINT II 
THE CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY ALLSTATE IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OP THIS CASE 
Allstate really cites only two Utah cases to support 
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the trial court's decision granting Allstate's summary judgment 
motion. Black believes both cases cited by Allstate are readily 
distinguishable from the instant case and are not controlling of 
the issues presented herein. 
Allstate primarily relies on the recent decision of 
Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah 1999), in support of its 
contention that the trial court correctly concluded that Black's 
claim against Allstate is an impermissible direct third-party 
claim against the Gallagher policy. Sperry dealt with one spouse 
suing her co-insured spouse husband for the wrongful death of 
their child arising out of an automobile accident wherein the 
husband fell asleep at the wheel, resulting in the death of the 
parties7 child who was a passenger in the vehicle. Thus, Sperry 
involved a single policy issued by the insurer, where the 
plaintiff wife was making a claim against her co-insured husband 
under the liability coverage provided by their automobile 
insurance policy. This Court correctly noted that the under the 
facts presented in the Sperry case, the insurer's duty arising 
out of the single policy involved was the duty to defend the 
defendant husband under the liability coverage of the policy, and 
that under the facts the no duty arising out of the policy ran to 
the plaintiff wife, who under the specific facts was merely a 
third-party beneficiary claimant, not a first-party to the 
insurance contract in spite of her being a co-insured under the 
policy, and consequently was not owed a duty of good faith by the 
insurer. Id. at 383-384. 
In contrast to the facts of Sperry, the instant case 
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dealt with two separate and distinct policies- Black's claim 
against Allstate is based on duties Allstate owed him under the 
provisions of his own policy with Allstate (i.e., he is a first 
party to his insurance contract), specifically the duties to 
defend and to act fairly and in good faith- However, as the terms 
are somewhat inconsistently used in Beck v- Farmers Ins. Exch., 
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), Black is suing Allstate in a "third 
party situation"- As used in Beck, this term does not indicate 
that the insured plaintiff suing his insurer is not owed a duty 
of good faith. Quite the contrary, under the Beck analysis, a 
third party situation entitles the insured to claim against his 
insurer not only in contract, as would be the case in Beck's 
"first party situations," but also in tort- Id. Thus, Black is a 
"first party" in the general sense because he is suing Allstate 
for breaching its contract with him and the duties owed to him 
under his own contract with Allstate; but at the same time, 
because his claim against Allstate is based on its contractual 
duty to defend him against the claim by Gallagher against him, 
his claim against Allstate is a "third party" situation under the 
Beck analysis, entitling Black to sue Allstate not only in 
contract, but in tort. 
Similarly, the case of Pixton v. State Farm Mut- Auto. 
Ins. Co-, 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991), does not support 
Allstate's position herein- In Pixton, although both parties to 
the underlying accident were insured by the same insurer, State 
Farm, there was no claim whatsoever against the plaintiff 
Pixton's policy, either by Pixton herself or by the other party 
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to the accident. As the Pixton Court noted, "... Pixton has no 
relevant contractual relationship with State Farm. Pixton made no 
claim that State Farm failed to perform any obligation under her 
no-fault insurance policy with State Farm." Jd. at p. 749. 
In contrast to the factual situation in Pixton, in this 
case Black's claim against Allstate is based (as is clearly 
alleged in his Complaint) on Allstate's duties to Black arising 
out of Black's own policy contract with Allstate, not Allstate's 
contract with Gallagher. 
It may be useful to look at the facts of this case with 
a hypothetical difference that Allstate was not the insurer of 
Gallagher. Black would have made a claim against Gallagher's 
policy issued by this hypothetical other insurer, and Gallagher 
would have made a claim against Black's Allstate policy. Assuming 
Allstate, in its adjustment process, failed to contact the only 
witness to the accident, and accepted the facts as asserted by 
Black and the sole witness, including that Gallagher had run the 
red light several seconds after it turned red (and which same 
facts a court later ruled supported a determination of 100% fault 
on the part of Gallagher), and yet Allstate went ahead and 
conceded liability against its insured, Black. Would Black then 
have a claim against Allstate for breaching its contractual 
duties to him? The obvious answer is, of course he would! 
Allstate would have had the same duty to defend Black against the 
Gallagher claim, which encompasses the duty to diligently 
investigate the claim to determine if it is valid, fairly 
evaluate the claim, and act reasonably and fairly in rejecting or 
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settling the claim. Beck, supra at 701 P.2d 801. In making this 
evaluation in such a third party situation as described in Beck, 
Allstate's duty to Black would be of a fiduciary nature to 
protect Black's interests as zealously as it would its own. Id. 
at 799. Allstate has cited no rationale or authority to suggest 
that it has no such duties to Black under the Black policy merely 
because the other party to the accident was also insured by 
Allstate and it willingly placed itself in a conflict of interest 
position by adjusting both opposing claims together. 
POINT III 
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS BLACK'S RIGHT TO SUE 
ALLSTATE FOR BREACHING ITS DUTIES TO BLACK 
ARISING OUT OF HIS OWN POLICY 
Allstate's position appears to be that whenever it 
insures both parties to an automobile accident where each side 
makes claim against the others liability coverage, Allstate may 
be excused from any duties that it would otherwise owe to either 
of the parties and resolve the conflicting claims in any manner 
it chooses. Under Allstate's reasoning, if either party objected 
to the way Allstate resolved the claim against his liability 
policy, they would be without any remedy since, under Allstate's 
analysis, any such objection would be an impermissible direct 
third party claim against the other's policy. As one would 
readily expect, and as happened here, Allstate's resolution of 
the opposing claims would be whatever was most beneficial to 
Allstate. One of, or even both of, the parties to the accident 
would almost invariably not be getting what they "bought and paid 
for" in purchasing their policy from Allstate, but would have no 
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Black's Complaint clearly arid appropriately, under the facts 
alleged, states claims against Allstate arising out of the breach 
of duties it owed Black under his own policy with Allstate. There 
is no basis to conclude that Allstate is excused from its duties 
to Black arising out of Black's insurance contract with Allstate, 
simply because Allstate willingly placed itself in the obvious 
conflict of interest position of adjusting the two opposing 
claims herein together. 
The court should reject Allstate's argument that it 
owed no duty to Black under the facts herein, and reinstate 
Black's claims against Allstate in the trial court for further 
discovery, and if necessary, trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of July, 2003. 
Eric P. Haftman 
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